Assessment of the Retrieval of Economic Incentives and Information Provision on Quality-of-care Indicators for Primary Care Professionals
Assessment of the Retrieval of Economic Incentives and Information Provision on Quality-of-care Indicators for Primary Care Professionals
Background: Information provision and economic incentives for professionals are measures aimed at improving quality-of-care in primary care. They are frequently implemented in combination, thus, there is a lack of evidence confirming their individual effectiveness. Since 2006, the Catalan Health Institute (ICS) has implemented a quality improvement system based on a) informing professionals on the result of quality-of-care indicators through an online platform, and simultaneously b) introducing economic incentives in a pay-for-performance (P4P) scheme. There is an unmet need for evidence on the specific impacts of these interventions on quality-of-care.
Aims: Overall, the main aim of the study is to analyze the impact of removing information provision and economic incentives on quality-of-care indicators. Specifically, investigators aim (1) to analyze the effect of removing an economic incentive from a quality-of-care indicator, (2) to analyze the effect of removing information provision from an indicator, (3) to evaluate such effects based on the type of indicator, (4) to evaluate potential spillover effects between indicators linked to the same health problem, and (5) to evaluate potential changes in the professionals' registry patterns.
Methods: The study will be an unblinded cluster randomized clinical trial, with 3 branches: (1) Control, with no changes in the information/incentive schemes; (2) Removal of the economic incentives from a subset of 7 indicators; (3) Removal of the economic incentives and information linked to the 7 indicators. The study duration will be from February to December 2025, with intermediate analyses at 3, 6 and 9 months. The reference population will be the 68 ICS primary care practices (PCPs) in the regions of Catalunya Central, Penedès and Girona. The primary endpoint will be the monthly quality-of-care indicator result of the 7 indicators, and secondary endpoints will include PCP, professional and patient characteristics. The analysis of the intervention effects will be carried out using mixed models and comparing the evolution of results versus the previous years (2019-2024).
Background
Primary care serves as the first point of contact for patients within the healthcare system, addressing key health issues through preventive, curative, and rehabilitative services. Economic incentives, such as pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes, aim to align healthcare professionals' objectives with those of health providers and society by rewarding the achievement of quality-of-care targets. In many cases, P4P is implemented alongside information provision, as seen in the UK's Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), where public reporting of quality indicators adds a reputational incentive. However, the interaction between financial and non-financial incentives remains complex, and their long-term effects on quality-of-care continue to be debated.
In Catalonia, the Catalan Institute of Health (ICS) has implemented a quality improvement system since 2006, using the Quality Standard of Care (EQA) framework, which includes 118 evidence-based indicators. This system combines real-time performance feedback through an online platform (information provision) with financial incentives linked to achieving specific targets. While the approach has been well established, many incentivized indicators have plateaued in performance, raising questions about the added value of financial incentives beyond information provision alone in such situations. This study aims to evaluate the impact of removing economic incentives or information on selected EQA indicators, assessing effects by indicator type and exploring interactions between related indicators. The findings will provide crucial insights to optimize incentive strategies and improve healthcare quality in Catalonia.
Aims
General aim: To study the impact of removing economic incentives and/or information provision on quality-of-care indicators among primary care professionals.
Specific aims:
Study design
A cluster-randomized clinical trial without blinding. The study will include the following groups (further detail provided in the Arms and Interventions section):
Study Period and Duration
The study will take place from February 2025 to December 2025. Weekly monitoring of the primary outcome variable will be conducted, with interim analyses at 3, 6, and 9 months.
Setting and Target Population
The study will be conducted in primary care practices (PCPs) of the Catalan Health Institute (ICS). To minimize interference from territorial management incentives and encourage participation, the trial will be carried out in three regional health management areas: Catalunya Central, Penedès and Girona. These regions were selected after discussions with their management teams and agreement on the study's implementation.
The trial will be conducted at the level of individual healthcare professionals (family physicians and nurses). However, randomization will be performed at the PCP level, ensuring that all professionals within the same PCP are assigned to the same arm of the study.
Statistical analysis
The analysis will be conducted at both the individual professional and EAP levels and will include all professionals from both intervention and control EAPs, regardless of whether they have used clinical decision support tools (SISAP web and/or patient lists). The analysis will follow an intention-to-treat (ITT) approach.
First, a descriptive analysis will be performed to assess the characteristics of each group, ensuring balance across different EAP and professional-level characteristics. Balance will be evaluated using the standardized mean difference (SMD), where an SMD > 0.1 will indicate imbalance.
The primary analysis will be focused on the effect of incentive and information withdrawal. The effect of removing financial incentives and removing both incentives and information will be analyzed using mixed-effects models, which account for intra-cluster variability and EAP-level clustering effects. A linear mixed-effects model will be used, considering both fixed and random effects. Fixed effects will include the intervention and any imbalanced covariates (based on SMD > 0.1). Random effects will account for variability within clusters (EAPs). Results will be reported as effect estimates with 95% confidence intervals (CI95%). In addition to the above, pre-post models will also be conducted to compare current vs. past performance for the same indicators.These analyses will be conducted at 3, 6, 9, and 12 months.
To assess for changes in documentation patterns (objective #5), the study will compare the distribution of systolic (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP) values recorded for patients included in blood pressure-related indicators across control and intervention groups. The descriptive statistics mean ± standard deviation (SD) and median ± interquartile range (IQR) will be reported. T-tests will be used to compare mean differences between groups.
ANOVA followed by Tukey's post-hoc test will be used for multiple comparisons. If normality or homoscedasticity assumptions are violated, non-parametric tests will be applied instead. Statistical significance (α = 0.05) will be adjusted for multiple comparisons to control for Type I errors.
Informed consent
The regional and PCP management teams have the authority to decide which indicators contribute to the P4P scheme for each professional. This system allows a certain flexibility in awarding economic incentives for professionals. Given this framework, individual informed consent from professionals is not deemed necessary. However, the study will be presented to the directors of the participating PCPs and their agreement to participate in the study will be collected with study participation acceptance forms. These stakeholders will be fully informed about the study, including the fact that their professionals will be enrolled in a randomized clinical trial, and that professionals in the intervention groups (where some indicators have their points removed) will not experience any financial penalty. As a secondary validation, professionals will implicitly confirm their consent when signing their P4P scheme agreements. If any professional disagrees with their P4P scheme, they will be excluded from the study, and no intervention will be applied to them.
Inclusion Criteria:
Exclusion Criteria: